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THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: WHAT IS THE
BASIS FOR THE SECTION 5 BASELINE?
Sabina Jacobs*
In 1965, Congress enacted section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to curb
unconstitutional voting practices in the jurisdictions that had most
egregiously violated the constitutional voting rights of minority citizens.
Section 5 requires these "covered" jurisdictions to obtain federal
preapproval, known as "preclearance, " before implementing any
changes related to voting to ensure that discriminatory practices are
not enacted in these jurisdictions. Since its implementation, the
preclearance inquiry has relied on the application of a dynamic
baseline, where a proposed change is compared to the status quo-the
relevant voting practice that is in effect when the proposed change is
submitted for preclearance. However, in 2008, the Chief Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court hinted in Riley v. Kennedy that section 5 should be
read to impose a static baseline. Under this approach, a proposed
change would be compared only to the relevant practice that was in
effect when a covered jurisdiction became subject to section 5,
regardless of any intervening changes that have since been precleared
and enacted. This Article argues that the Court should continue to
interpret section 5 to impose a dynamic baseline because this
interpretation is most consistent with the congressional intent behind
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. A contrary interpretation would
undermine the purpose of section 5 and endanger the progress that has
already been made since 1965.
"The right to vote is the most fundamental right in our
democratic system of government because its effective exercise is
preservative of all others." Report by the House of Representatives
on the Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.'
. J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., University of
California, Berkeley. I would like to thank the editors and the staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review for their tireless work on this Article. A very special thanks to Professor Richard L.
Hasen for his invaluable guidance and to Nicole Ochi for her patience and advice. Most
importantly, I would like to thank my family, whose unconditional love and support make
everything-including this Article-possible.
1. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 6 (2006).
576 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:575
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act2 ("VRA") to
"enforce the guarantees of the 15th amendment to the Constitution of
the United States" 3 and to end discriminatory voting practices that
disenfranchised racial minorities.4  Such practices included poll
taxes, literacy tests, and bureaucratic restrictions that prevented
minority citizens from not only voting, but also from registering to
vote.5 The VRA was a radical departure from prior laws that
Congress had enacted to eliminate discriminatory voting practices
that had proved to be unsuccessful.6 Dismayed that "[p]rogress has
been painfully slow, in part because of the intransigence of State and
local officials and repeated delays in the judicial process," 7 Congress
implemented a stronger remedy. Since its enactment, the VRA has
been lauded as "the most effective civil rights legislation ever
passed."8 The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed that "[t]he statute was
enacted to protect voting rights that are not adequately protected by
the Constitution itself,"9  and the Court has upheld the
constitutionality of the VRA's core provisions on several
occasions. "
Section 5 is one of the key provisions of the VRA. "' This
section requires that certain jurisdictions 2-those in which
2. The Voting Rights Act is codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-6 (2006).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 1 (1965) reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2437.
4. Voting Rights Act (1965), http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=100
(last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
5. Id.
6. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 7 (2006) (noting that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was
prompted by the failure of 1957, 1960, and 1964 civil rights laws aimed at enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment).
7. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 2441.
8. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 11 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 777.
9. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991).
10. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966); RICHARD L. HASEN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH
V. GORE 121-29 (2003) (noting that the constitutionality of section 5 was subsequently
challenged and upheld in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) and Lopez v.
Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999)).
11. Section 5 of the VRA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
12. The following jurisdictions became covered under section 5 in 1965: Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and selected counties in North Carolina (Anson,
Bertie, Caswell, Chowan, Craven, Cumberland, Edgecombe, Franklin, Gates, Granville, Greene,
Halifax, Hertford, Hoke, Lenoir, Nash, Northampton, Onslow, Pasquotank, Person, Pitt, Robeson,
Scotland, Vance, Wayne, and Wilson). The following jurisdictions became covered in 1971:
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discriminatory voting practices have been most prevalent-obtain
preapproval from either the U.S. attorney general at the U.S.
Department of Justice or the U.S. district court for the District of
Columbia before they can change their voting practices. "3 This
preapproval process, known as "preclearance," 4 ensures that any
change related to voting in these jurisdictions "neither has the
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color, or [language]." "5 Congress has
considered section 5 to be its "front line defense against voting
discrimination" 6 because it is designed to prevent, rather than just
combat, "7 the emergence of discriminatory voting practices.
The critical issue in a preclearance inquiry is whether a proposed
change to a voting practice is discriminatory in intent or impact. "
To determine whether a proposed change merits preclearance, the
U.S. attorney general or the U.S. district court for the District of
Columbia must necessarily compare the proposed voting practice to
the corresponding prior practice that it would replace. The
corresponding prior practice is the baseline to which the proposed
change must be compared to determine its compliance with the
California counties (Kings, Monterey, and Yuba) and New York counties (Bronx, Kings, and
New York). Several New Hampshire townships became covered in 1974 (Rindge, Millsfield,
Pinkhams, Stewartstown, Stratford, Benton, Antrim, Boscawen, Newington, and Unity). The
following jurisdictions became covered in 1975: Alaska, Arizona, Texas, another California
county (Merced), and three Florida counties (Hardee, Hillsborough, and Monroe). A few
additional jurisdictions became covered in 1966 and 1976. U.S. Department of Justice, Section 5
Covered Districts, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec-5/covered.php (last visited Sept. 24,
2009).
13. Jocelyn Benson, Preparing for 2007: Legal and Legislative Issues Surrounding the
Reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 125, 143-44 (2005).
14. Id. at 126.
15. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580
(2006).
16. S. REP. No. 94-295 (1985), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 784. Section 5 most
often protects voters from discriminatory practices at the local level (cities, counties, towns,
school districts, and other local governing bodies) because roughly 90 percent of the submissions
requesting preclearance are proposals to change local voting practices, and "local election abuses
are most likely to go undetected and unremedied." SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY:
THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION 110 (2006).
17. Section 2 of the VRA generally proscribes voting practices that discriminate on the basis
of race, color, or language. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006). However, the burden to establish that a
certain voting practice is discriminatory is on the challenger-the voters whose voting rights were
infringed, or parties on behalf of such voters. Id. See infra Part VII.B for a discussion about the
inadequacies of section 2 as compared to section 5.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
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VRA. But, section 5 does not define this baseline; it does not clearly
state to which prior corresponding practice the proposed change must
be compared-the immediately preceding practice, or the prior
practice that was in effect at the time that the specific jurisdiction
became covered under section 5. The first alternative would provide
what this Article terms a "dynamic baseline" pursuant to which a
proposed voting change would be compared with the most recent
relevant practice-the status quo. A dynamic baseline would shift
with progress and would account for all precleared intervening
changes since the jurisdiction's coverage date. The second
alternative would provide what this Article terms a "static baseline"
pursuant to which a proposed voting change would always be
compared to the relevant voting practice that was in effect on the
jurisdiction's coverage date-November 1, 1964, November 1, 1968,
or November 1, 1972 9 -irrespective of any intervening changes that
may have since been precleared and implemented. A static baseline
would remain unaffected by progressive intervening changes, even if
the original practice at the time of coverage is more discriminatory
relative to the most current practice that has been precleared and
enacted.
Traditionally, section 5 has been understood by the U.S.
Supreme Court to impose a dynamic baseline that shifts each time a
voting practice is approved in accordance with the VRA. 2 0 However,
during the 2007 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court casually suggested in
Riley v. Kennedy2 that section 5 may be read to impose a static
baseline. 22
The facts of Riley are not simple, but most of its intricacies do
not bear directly on the baseline issue. The dispute in Riley
concerned the method that Mobile County, Alabama, uses to fill
midterm vacancies on its county commission. 23 Alabama became
covered under section 5 in 1965.4 As of November 1, 1964,2" the
19. Section 5 delineates these three coverage dates. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
20. See discussion infra Part V.
21. 128 S. Ct. 1970(2008).
22. Id. at 1982 n.7.
23. Id. at 1978.
24. Id.
25. Jurisdictions that became covered as of 1965 were required to submit all changes to their
voting practices that were different from those in force or effect on November 1, 1964. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c(a) (2006).
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county filled these midterm vacancies by gubernatorial
appointment. 26 However, in 1985, the state passed a law-
precleared by the U.S. attorney general-that required future
midterm vacancies to be filled by special election.27 Mobile County
held its first special election in 1987 to fill one such vacancy, 28 but
the Alabama Supreme Court later invalidated the state law pursuant
to which the special election was held on the grounds that the law
violated Alabama's state constitution. The court then ordered
Mobile County to resume filling its midterm vacancies by
gubernatorial appointment. 2 9 But, this change in procedure ordered
by the Alabama Supreme Court was never submitted for
preclearance or otherwise approved by either the U.S. attorney
general or the U.S. district court for the District of Columbia."3 After
Alabama Governor Bob Riley used his appointment power to fill the
midterm vacancy, three plaintiffs filed a complaint against Riley
alleging that he violated section 5 because Alabama had not obtained
preclearance for this change in voting practice mandated by the state
court. "  The district court held that the state must obtain
preclearance for this state court-mandated change. 32 On appeal, a
three-judge court agreed that without preclearance, this change
violated section 5 of the VRA. 33
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
The Court in Riley held that the practice of filling midterm vacancies
through special elections was never "in force or effect" for the
purpose of section 5 preclearance. 15 The Court reasoned that in spite
of the 1987 special election held by Mobile County in accordance
with the law that was in effect at that time, this law did not actually
change the voting procedure because it was subsequently invalidated
26. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1978.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1979-80.
30. Id.
31. Kennedy v. Riley, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (M.D. Ala. 2006).
32. Id. at 1337.
33. See Kennedy v. Riley, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32123, at *1-2 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
34. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1982.
35. Id. at 1982.
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by Alabama's highest court. 36 However, the Court's holding did not
formally address the issue of whether Alabama had to seek
preclearance to implement the order issued by Alabama's supreme
court to change the method of filling midterm vacancies from special
election to gubernatorial appointment. The Court simply passed on
the opportunity to define or redefine the section 5 baseline.
The Court limited its holding to the specific facts of Riley,37 but
a significant and potentially far-reaching issue emerged. During oral
arguments in Riley, Chief Justice John Roberts implied that section 5
called for a static baseline.38 His "quaint fixation on the language of
the statute ' 39 prompted him to ask each attorney why Alabama had
to apply for preclearance in the first place if the proposed change
ordered by the state's supreme court would simply cause the county
to revert to the same voting practice that was in effect on
November 1, 1964.40 Through his line of questioning, the Chief
Justice suggested that an intervening change, such as the 1985
Alabama state law, should not alter the baseline analysis.
Effectively, the Chief Justice proposed reinterpreting section 5 to
impose a static baseline even though section 5 has always been
interpreted to impose a dynamic baseline since the enactment of the
VRA.
Ultimately, the Court's narrow decision in Riley avoided the
baseline issue raised by the Chief Justice. Instead, the Court
addressed the Chief Justice's suggestion to reinterpret the section 5
baseline only in a brief footnote:
By its terms, § 5 requires preclearance of any election
practice that is "different from that in force or effect on" the
relevant coverage date-in this case, November 1, 1964.
Governor Riley's opening brief suggested that this text
could be read to mean that no preclearance is required if a
covered jurisdiction seeks to adopt the same practice that
was in force or effect on its coverage date--even if,
36. Id. at 1984. The Supreme Court reasoned that the following "extraordinary
circumstance" compelled this conclusion: "The Act was challenged in state court at first
opportunity, the lone election was held in the shadow of that legal challenge, and the Act was
ultimately invalidated by the Alabama Supreme Court." Id.
37. Id. at 1986.
38. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Riley, 128 S. Ct. 1970 (No. 07-77).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 22-23, 43, 54-55.
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because of intervening changes, that practice is different
from the jurisdiction's baseline. In response, Kennedy and
the United States noted that the DOJ and the lower courts to
consider the question have rejected this interpretation. We
need not resolve this dispute because the result in this case
is the same under either view. "
Although the Court left the baseline question undecided, it
effectively questioned the settled interpretation and application of
section 5. This Article squarely addresses the issue of the section 5
baseline and offers one modest proposal: section 5 should continue to
be interpreted to impose a dynamic baseline. A dynamic baseline is
most consistent with the purpose, legislative intent, and statutory text
of the VRA. Most importantly, a dynamic baseline preserves the
clearly articulated intent of Congress to protect and advance minority
voting rights. A static baseline, on the other hand, drastically limits
the protections of the VRA and would allow covered jurisdictions to
backslide to the voting practices that were in effect on their
respective coverage dates, even if intervening changes that advanced
minority voting rights have since been precleared and implemented.
Part II demonstrates that there is sufficient textual evidence that
section 5 imposes a dynamic baseline. Imposing a static baseline
would render the text of section 5 and the rest of the VRA
ambiguous and inconsistent. Part III explains that the broad purpose
of the VRA and the goals of section 5 mandate the application of a
dynamic baseline. Part IV discusses the congressional intent for
section 5 to impose a dynamic baseline that is manifested in the
VRA's extensive legislative history. Part V illustrates the consistent
application of a dynamic baseline in judicial precedents. Part VI
discusses the interpretation of section 5 and the application of a
dynamic baseline by the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S.
attorney general. Finally, Part VII cautions about the detrimental
policy implications of reinterpreting section 5 to yield a static
baseline.
41. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1982 n.7 (citation omitted).
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II. THE TEXT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IS INCONSISTENT
UNLESS SECTION 5 IMPOSES A DYNAMIC BASELINE
When it comes to statutory construction, the words of the statute
are paramount.42  Section 5 of the VRA requires a covered
jurisdiction to obtain preclearance "[w]henever a State or political
subdivision . . . shall enact or seek to administer any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect
on November 1, 1964, or... November 1, 1968, or... November 1,
1972." 4' There are three distinct dates in the statute because a
jurisdiction's coverage date-the date after which any change to a
voting practice must be precleared before it may be enacted-
depends on when the particular jurisdiction became subject to section
5.44 The question is, what significance should be accorded to these
dates? Should the language of section 5 be interpreted to impose a
static or a dynamic baseline? A static baseline would require a
constant comparison of a proposed change to the corresponding
42. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 849 (4th ed.
2007).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). Section 5(a) reads, in relevant part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set
forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first
sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer
any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, or
whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set
forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the second
sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer
any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, or
whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set
forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the third
sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer
any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such
State or subdivision may institute an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or [language] ... and unless and
until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for
failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure ....
Id.
44. See U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 12 (listing the dates covered jurisdictions
became subject to the section 5 preclearance mandate).
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practice that was in effect on the given jurisdiction's coverage date-
one of the dates listed above-regardless of intervening changes. A
dynamic baseline would require the comparison of a proposed
change to the status quo-the most recent practice that is in effect
when the change is proposed.
At first blush, the text45 of section 5 appears to suggest that
section 5 imposes the use of a static baseline. A natural reading46 of
the first sentence of section 5(a) seems to indicate that the baseline in
a covered jurisdiction is ascertained when a given jurisdiction
becomes subject to section 5 preclearance, and remains permanently
linked to the relevant coverage date for that jurisdiction. After all,
the text states that a covered jurisdiction must submit a change for
preclearance that is "different from that in force or effect on
November 1, 1964, or . . . November 1, 1968, or . . . November 1,
1972." 4" The specific reference to these dates seems to indicate that
Congress intended the comparative baseline to reflect the voting
practices that were in effect on one of these three dates. In a
vacuum, this may seem to be a sound interpretation. But, the correct
interpretation of section 5 cannot rest on a reading of this phrase in
isolation because "[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided
by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law."48 Thus, the analysis cannot end with
this single phrase and these three dates.
The problem with an isolated reading of section 5(a) is that it
does not take into account the rest of the language in this subsection
or the other sections of the VRA. Out of context, any interpretation
of the baseline is suspect because "[s]tatutory construction . . . is a
holistic endeavor."49 A holistic analysis of the relevant provisions of
the VRA provides compelling evidence that interpreting the baseline
45. A court's analysis of a statute begins with the text itself. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.
Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008); Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of
Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 6-7 (2003); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP
P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETt, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 231 (2d
ed. 2006) (stating that the plain meaning of the text is either the best evidence of legislative intent
or the only authoritative basis for interpretation).
46. A natural, plain reading of a statute is based on the "obvious," "normal," or "ordinary"
understanding of the words of the statute. Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing the Plain
Language Rule of Statutory Construction: How and Why, 65 MONT. L. REv. 229, 240-42 (2004).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (emphasis added).
48. United States v. Boisdor6's Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850).
49. United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
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as static is, at best, conclusory, and, at worst, wholly wrong. First, an
analysis of section 5(a)-the subsection in which the dates appear
and the sole basis for an interpretation that section 5 requires the use
of a static baseline-suggests that the Chief Justice may have
misinterpreted the significance of these dates. Second, an
interpretation yielding a static baseline would necessarily ignore
other provisions of section 5(a), which would result in the
misapplication of the preclearance mandate. Third, a static baseline
would be incompatible with the other three subsections of section 5
that were recently added to the statute in 2006. Finally, a static
baseline would not comport with section 450 of the VRA, which is
repeatedly referenced in section 5(a).
A. The Dates in Section 5(a) Define the Covered
Jurisdictions, Not Their Baselines
When section 5(a) is read as a whole, it is less clear that the
three listed dates-November 1, 1964, November 1, 1968, and
November 1, 1972-are actually intended to serve as three distinct
and fixed baselines to be used every time covered jurisdictions seek
preclearance for proposed changes to their voting practices. An
alternative and more plausible interpretation is that these three dates
should not be read in isolation of the phrases in which they reside.
Instead of defining three permanent baselines, section 5(a) defines
three sets of covered jurisdictions. The first set of covered
jurisdictions ("Set 1") is described in the following phrase:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to
which the prohibitions set forth in [section 4(a)] based upon
determinations made under the first sentence of [section
4(b)] are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from
that in force or effect on November 1, 1964 . . .51
Understanding the contours of Set 1 requires reference to section 4.
Based on the first sentence of section 4(b), 52 jurisdictions in Set 1
50. Section 4 of the VRA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b.
51. Id. § 1973c(a) (emphasis added).
52. Section 4(b) states, in relevant part:
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or in any
political subdivision of a State which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained
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were covered under section 5 beginning in 1965, the year that the
VRA was initially enacted. Set 1 is composed of jurisdictions in
which "less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing
therein were registered"53 to vote as of November 1, 1964, or "voted
in the presidential election of November 1964."1 4  Thus, in Set 1
jurisdictions, all changes related to voting practices made after
November 1, 1964 must be precleared by either the U.S. attorney
general or the U.S. district court for the District of Columbia.
The second set of covered jurisdictions ("Set 2") is described in
the following phrase:
[W]henever a State or political subdivision with respect to
which the prohibitions set forth in [section 4(a)] of this title
based upon determinations made under the second sentence
of/[section 4(b)] of this title are in effect shall enact or seek
to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1968...."
Based on section 5(a) and the second sentence of section 4(b),56
Set 2 includes jurisdictions in which "less than 50 per centum of the
on November 1, 1964, any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of
the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age
residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centum
of such persons voted in the presidential election of November 1964. On and after
August 6, 1970, in addition to any State or political subdivision of a State determined
to be subject to subsection (a) of this section pursuant to the previous sentence, the
provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or any political
subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney General determines maintained on
November 1, 1968, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of the
Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing
therein were registered on November 1, 1968, or that less than 50 per centum of such
persons voted in the presidential election of November 1968. On and after August 6,
1975, in addition to any State or political subdivision of a State determined to be
subject to subsection (a) of this section pursuant to the previous two sentences, the
provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or any political
subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney General determines maintained on
November 1, 1972, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of the
Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the citizens of voting age were
registered on November 1, 1972, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted
in the Presidential election of November 1972 ....
Id. § 1973b(b) (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 1973c(a) (emphasis added).
56. See supra note 52.
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persons of voting age residing therein were registered on November
1, 1968, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the
presidential election of November 1968." 17 Thus, November 1, 1968
marks the date after which all changes to voting practices in Set 2
jurisdictions must be precleared.
Finally, the third set of covered jurisdictions ("Set 3") is
described in the following phrase:
[W]henever a State or political subdivision with respect to
which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this
title based upon determinations made under the third
sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall
enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting different from that in force or effect
on November 1, 1972.... ."
In concert with the third sentence of section 4(b),59 section 5(a)
describes Set 3, which includes jurisdictions in which "less than 50
per centum of the citizens of voting age were registered on
November 1, 1972, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons
voted in the Presidential election of November 1972."6 Thus,
November 1, 1972, marks the date after which all changes to voting
practices in Set 3 jurisdictions must be precleared.
The requirements imposed on covered jurisdictions in Set 1, Set
2, and Set 3 are the same: a covered jurisdiction must obtain
preclearance before it can lawfully enact a change to its voting
practices. The only difference between Set 1, Set 2, and Set 3 is their
respective starting points: Set 1 is subject to section 5 for all voting
changes made after November 1, 1964; Set 2 is subject to section 5
for all voting changes made after November 1, 1968; and Set 3 is
subject to section 5 for all voting changes made after November 1,
1972.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). These jurisdictions became subject to section 5 in 1970, when
Congress first amended the Voting Rights Act. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970).
58. Id. § 1973c(a) (emphasis added).
59. See supra note 52.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). These jurisdictions became subject to section 5 in 1975, when
Congress again amended the Voting Rights Act. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975).
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This interpretation of section 5(a) is appropriate for at least three
reasons. First, the diction and syntax of section 5(a) indicate that
Congress intended to list and define the jurisdictions that must
comply with the preclearance mandate. The use of the disjunctive
"or" to separate each of the three phrases suggests that each phrase
should be read independently and in its entirety; each phrase is
complete without reference to the other two, and each one
independently defines one of the three sets of covered jurisdictions.
Thus, the syntactical structure suggests that the dates are just part and
parcel of a list describing Set 1, Set 2, and Set 3, and should not be
interpreted to have independent significance.
Second, because section 5(a) incorporates and references section
4, any interpretation of section 5(a) must comport with the language
in section 4. Section 4 explains the coverage formula and the
significance of the three dates for each of the three sets of covered
jurisdictions. Therefore, a proper interpretation of the dates in
section 5(a) must be consistent with an interpretation of these
identical dates in section 4(b) because "[a] term appearing in several
places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it
appears." 6 Based on the language in section 4, these dates signify
only starting points for the enforcement of section 5 preclearance in a
specific covered jurisdiction, depending on whether it is in Set 1, Set
2, or Set 3. There is no indication that Congress intended for these
three dates to be interpreted differently in section 5(a).
Third, the entire first sentence of section 5(a) warrants a
thorough analysis because it is extremely long and convoluted.
Since "the most serious disease of language is ambiguity,"62 and "the
job of writing a clear statute remains formidable,"63 a simplistic
reading of section 5(a) that yields simply three fixed baseline dates
would deny this subsection the thorough analysis it is due to ensure a
correct interpretation. Undoubtedly, the first sentence of section
5(a), consisting of nearly 400 words, is far from clear. An
interpretation of section 5(a) in its entirety is warranted because the
Court should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
61. Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994).
62. Reed Dickerson, The Diseases of Legislative Language, 1 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 5, 6
(1964).
63. Id. at 6.
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statute. 64  Admittedly, such a thorough analysis may render
ambiguous section 5(a) and the significance of the three dates.
However, the remaining provisions of section 5 and the other
sections of the VRA provide clarity and bolster the interpretation that
section 5 nevertheless is intended to impose a dynamic baseline.
B. A Static Baseline Fails to Ensure That Subsequent
Changes Do Not Deny or Abridge the Right to Vote
The precise significance of the dates in section 5(a) may be
ambiguous. It is not certain that the dates establish a static baseline.
But, the condition upon which the U.S. attorney general or the U.S.
district court for the District of Columbia grants preclearance is not
ambiguous. Section 5(a) states that a covered jurisdiction must
obtain preclearance for a voting change if that "qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure neither has the purpose
nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color, or [language]." 65 This phrase lies at the
heart of section 5 and embodies the chief protection that the
preclearance mandate has extended to minority voters. A static
baseline, however, would prevent section 5 from providing this
protection.
The incompatibility between a static baseline and the
preclearance prerequisite, though not readily apparent, is
unavoidable. Imagine the following scenario: In 1964, Alabama's
governor appointed the board of supervisors for each county in the
state. In 1965, Alabama became subject to section 5 of the VRA,
such that all changes to its voting practices after November 1, 1964
would have to be precleared.66  Then in 1970, the Alabama
legislature passed a precleared law that made county supervisors
elected positions. It is now 2009 and Alabama voters have been
electing their county board of supervisors for almost forty years.
What if the Alabama legislature decided this year that it wanted the
governor to once again appoint its county supervisors? Could
Alabama enact this change?
64. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006) (emphasis added). Section 1973b(f)(2) protects language
minorities from discriminatory voting practices. Id. § 1973b(f)(2).
66. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 12 (noting Alabama's inclusion under section 5).
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If section 5 imposed only a static baseline, then the legislature
could unilaterally enact this change without even submitting it for
preclearance because it would not constitute an actual change when
compared with the practice that was in effect in 1964. Even if this
change would purposefully or effectively deny or abridge a citizen's
right to vote on account of race, color, or language 67-in violation of
the VRA-the Alabama legislature could still circumvent the
preclearance mandate and reinstate a discriminatory voting practice
that was in effect when Alabama became subject to section 5.
However, the application of a dynamic baseline would require
the Alabama legislature to submit its proposed change for
preclearance. If the change were deemed discriminatory, then it
would not be precleared and Alabama could not legally empower its
governor to once again appoint county supervisors. Thus, a dynamic
baseline would advance the purpose of the preclearance mandate,
while a static baseline would frustrate it.
C. A Static Baseline Is Incompatible with
Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of Section 5
In 2006, Congress amended and reauthorized the VRA, adding
three new subsections to section 5.6 An interpretation of section 5 is
incomplete without an analysis of these other subsections because
"[w]hen Congress acts to amend a statute, [the Court] presume[s] it
intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect." 69 Even if
section 5(a) could be internally reconciled, a static baseline would
nonetheless be incompatible with the three new subsections. Each of
the three subsections supports the proposition that Congress intended
for section 5 to impose a dynamic baseline, even if subsection (a)
alone lacks such clarity.
First, Congress added subsection (c) to the text of section 5
because it was dissatisfied with the U.S. Supreme Court's limited
interpretation in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier
67. In 2000, 71 percent of Alabama's population was white. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000
CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING at 1 (2000), available at http://www2.census.gov/
census_2000/datasets/demographic-profile/Alabama/2khO1 .pdf.
68. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
69. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995).
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Parish II).7" This subsection clarifies that "any discriminatory
purpose" is sufficient to justify the denial of preclearance. "' Unlike
the Court's incorrect interpretation in Bossier Parish II, an
impermissible purpose need not be discriminatory and
retrogressive.72 By rejecting retrogression as the determinative
factor in the preclearance analysis by way of subsection (c),
Congress asserted that the focus of section 5 is to prevent covered
jurisdictions from enacting discriminatory voting practices. " As
illustrated by the Alabama hypothetical discussed in the preceding
section, a static baseline would enable uncooperative jurisdictions to
circumvent the preclearance mandate. Under a static baseline
analysis, whether the voting practice that was in effect on a particular
jurisdiction's coverage date was in fact discriminatory-and there is
a strong probability that it was 74-would not affect whether this
practice would be considered to be the comparative baseline. A
dynamic baseline, on the other hand, would allow section 5 to
intervene and thwart the emergence of a discriminatory voting
practice, as mandated by subsection (c), even if that practice
resembled the practice that was in effect on the jurisdiction's
coverage date. A static baseline would only prevent the emergence
of discriminatory voting practices that were not in effect on the
coverage date, but it would allow the reemergence of discriminatory
voting practices that were in effect on the coverage date but had
since been replaced. Therefore, this new subsection is persuasive
evidence that a dynamic baseline-which would prevent the
reemergence of discriminatory voting practices-is consistent with
congressional intent.
Second, Congress added subsections (b) and (d) in response to
the Supreme Court's overly expansive interpretation of section 5 in
Georgia v. Ashcrofi. 75 Subsection (b) defines the types of voting
practices that would "deny or abridge" the right to vote. 76 The Court
70. 528 U.S. 320 (2000). Bossier Parish 11 is discussed in further detail in Part IV.D. 1.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(c) (2006).
72. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 1.
73. "The term 'purpose' in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall include any
discriminatory purpose." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(c) (2006).
74. Given the basis for coverage discussed in Part I.A, the likelihood that any given voting
practice was discriminatory is strong.
75. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). Georgia v. Ashcroft is discussed in further detail in Part IV.D. 1.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(c) (2006).
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in Georgia v. Ashcroft held that multiple factors are relevant to this
analysis. " But, Congress disagreed and enacted subsection (b) to
clarify the voting practices that violate the VRA and that section 5
was designed to prevent. 78 Subsection (b) defines an unacceptable
voting practice as follows:
Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting that
has the purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the
ability of any citizen of the United States on account of race
or color, [or language] . . . to elect their preferred
candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote
within the meaning of subsection (a) .. . . 79
To ensure that its intent would not be misinterpreted, Congress
added subsection (d) to clarify that "[t]he purpose of subsection
(b)... is to protect the ability of such citizens to elect their preferred
candidates of choice." 8 Returning to the aforementioned Alabama
hypothetical, it becomes apparent that interpreting subsection (a) to
impose a static baseline is incompatible with subsection (d).
Changing the process by which county supervisors are chosen from
special election to gubernatorial appointment would not protect the
rights of minority voters to elect their preferred candidates of choice;
in fact, the change would actually diminish-if not totally
eliminate-the ability of minorities to elect their preferred candidates
of choice, even though the hypothetical 1970 legislation discussed
above already protected this right. In contrast, a dynamic baseline
would require the proposed change to be compared with the status
quo-the election of county supervisors-and accordingly, it would
prevent the change to gubernatorial appointment, since this change
would diminish the voting rights of minority citizens that subsections
(b) and (d) were designed to safeguard.
Moreover, it is instructive that both of these subsections arose in
the wake of a redistricting case. s The U.S. Census Bureau collects
77. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,479, 480-83 (2003).
78. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (emphasis added).
80. Id. § 1973c(d) (emphasis added).
81. Congress added subsection (b) and (d) in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Georgia v. Ashcroft. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 1.
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new census data every ten years, 2 and redistricting efforts follow
each census report.8 3  The implications of this decennial data
collection system cannot be understated and must bear on the
analysis of the section 5 baseline. First, a static baseline would
require that the U.S. attorney general or the U.S. district court for the
District of Columbia compare every redistricting proposal in a
covered jurisdiction to either the 1964, 1968, or 1972 census data,
depending on the coverage date of the given jurisdiction. Applying
this methodology to Alabama, for instance, means that every
redistricting proposal in this state-whether submitted in 1970 or
2010-would be compared to 1964 data. It is unlikely that Congress
intended to permanently fix the comparative baseline for the
assessment of redistricting proposals to demographic data that was
applicable only in 1964.
The second consequence of applying a static baseline in the
redistricting context is that it renders the 2006 amendments
nonsensical. The addition of subsections (b) and (d) only makes
sense if Congress determined there is something more to "protect,"
something that subsection (a) alone was incapable of protecting.
These two subsections are evidence that Congress believed that in
the absence of subsections (b) and (d), the right of minority citizens
to elect their candidates of choice could be susceptible to diminution
through subsequent state legislation. If Congress had operated under
the presumption that section 5 imposed only a static baseline, then
subsections (b) and (d) would only operate to the extent that a
proposed practice did not resemble the relevant practice that was in
effect on the given jurisdiction's coverage date. Thus, the
application of a static baseline would render these subsections
incapable of preventing the reemergence of discriminatory
redistricting efforts; any ameliorative redistricting enactments would
have no bearing on the relevant comparison for any subsequent
82. The mandate for collecting census data every ten years is rooted in the U.S. Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
states which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers .... The
actual Enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the
United States, and within every subsequent term often years, in such manner as they shall by law
direct.") (emphasis added).
83. See U.S. Census Bureau, The Constitution, the Congress and the Census:
Representation and Reapportionment, http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/dropin7.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2009).
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redistricting proposal because the only relevant inquiry would be
focused on the state of affairs at the time the jurisdiction became
covered under section 5. Perhaps one could argue that Congress had
originally envisioned the application of a static baseline; but the 2006
amendments to section 5, which added subsections (b), (c), and (d),
are compelling evidence that Congress currently intends section 5 to
impose a dynamic baseline. 84
D. A Static Baseline Is Inconsistent with
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act
Interpreting section 5 to impose a static baseline is also
inconsistent with section 4 of the VRA. Aside from the
inconsistencies with section 4(b) discussed above,85 a static baseline
conflicts with the bailout provision of section 4, which provides an
exit strategy for jurisdictions covered by section 5. 6 Logically, like
two sides of the same coin-section 5 imposes the preclearance
mandate and section 4 lifts the mandate-the interpretations of
section 5 and section 4 must be compatible.
Under section 4, a covered jurisdiction can only obtain a
declaratory judgment that releases it from the preclearance mandate
if "during the ten years preceding the filing of the action,"87 the
covered jurisdiction did not engage in practices that denied or
abridged a citizen's right to vote,88 and demonstrated its compliance
with the provisions of section 5.89 These requirements are
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006).
85. See discussion supra Part II.A.
86. "Bailout" refers to the process by which covered jurisdictions can seek to be released
from the section 5 preclearance mandate. The bailout provision is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(a)(1).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2006).
88. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(A). There are also other requirements delineated in section 4. Id.
§ 1973b(a)(1) (requiring that "no final judgment of any court of the United States ... has
determined that denials or abridgements of the right to vote on account of race or color have
occurred anywhere in the [covered jurisdiction] . . ."; "no Federal examiners or
observers ... have been assigned to [the covered jurisdiction]"; "the Attorney General has not
interposed any objection"; and "[a covered jurisdiction has] eliminated voting procedures and
methods of election which inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process ... engaged in
constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of persons exercising rights [to
vote]" and "engaged in other constructive efforts ... at all stages of the election and registration
process").
89. Section 1973b(a)(1)(D) states, in relevant part:
[S]uch State or political subdivision and all governmental units within its territory have
complied with section 1973c of this title, including compliance with the requirement
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inextricably related. To assess a covered jurisdiction's eligibility for
bailout, the U.S. attorney general must assess how well the
jurisdiction has protected the rights of minority voters during the ten
years immediately preceding the bailout application date; no other
date is relevant to the bailout analysis.
But, if section 5 is interpreted to impose a static baseline, then it
is conceivable that a covered jurisdiction would be unable to satisfy
both of the aforementioned bailout requirements. This
incompatibility would arise in the event that a covered jurisdiction
seeks to reenact a voting practice that resembles the relevant practice
that was in effect on the jurisdiction's coverage date. This problem
is amplified if the jurisdiction had already precleared and enacted an
improvement to the voting practice that was in effect on the coverage
date, which it is now seeking to change, sometime during the past
decade prior to the bailout application. Under a static baseline, the
covered jurisdiction would not violate section 5 if it enacted this
change; but because the change would result in a diminution of
minority voting rights in the past ten years, it would certainly
disqualify the covered jurisdiction from bailout under section 4. This
incompatibility between the bailout provision and the application of
a static baseline-the fact that a covered jurisdiction could comply
with section 5 preclearance and still remain ineligible for section 4
bailout--demonstrates that these two standards are at odds with each
other. However, if the interpretation of section 5 includes the
application of a dynamic baseline, then compliance with the
preclearance mandate under section 5 would be sufficient to enable a
covered jurisdiction to apply for bailout under section 4.
There may be some textual evidence that section 5 could be
interpreted to yield a static baseline. But, in context, this scant
evidence is unconvincing. While "courts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says there,"9 this presumption is only valid "[w]hen the words of a
that no change covered by section 1973c of this title has been enforced without
preclearance under section 1973c of this title, and have repealed all changes covered by
section 1973c of this title to which the Attorney General has successfully objected or as
to which the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has denied a declaratory
judgment ....
Id. § 1973b(a)(l)(D).
90. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations omitted).
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statute are unambiguous." "9 Section 5(a), which is the only
indication of a static baseline, is not unambiguous. Although its
latent ambiguity may not be readily apparent, in conjunction with
section 4 and the rest of section 5, it becomes clear that a static
baseline can only be the result of a preliminary and simplistic
interpretation of section 5(a). Furthermore, to the extent that the text
of section 5 was ambiguous before 2006, the amendments to the
VRA that year provide additional evidence that Congress intends
section 5 to impose a dynamic baseline for the purpose of the
preclearance analysis. Altogether, the textual evidence in the VRA
supports the proposition that a covered jurisdiction's compliance
with section 5 should be assessed through the use of a dynamic
baseline.
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE
GOALS OF SECTION 5 REQUIRE THE USE OF A DYNAMIC BASELINE
Interpreting section 5 to impose a dynamic baseline is most
consistent with the purpose of the VRA and the goals of section 5.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with
its dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of
context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of
the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular
cases the generally expressed legislative policy. 92
Because "[i]t is dangerous . . . to rely exclusively upon the literal
meaning of a statute's words divorced from consideration of the
statute's purpose,"93 ignoring the express intent of Congress as it
applies to the VRA and its provisions inherently entails the risk that
the VRA will be misinterpreted.
The broad purpose of the VRA and the specific goals of section
5 demonstrate that Congress intended this section to impose a
dynamic baseline. The Supreme Court has recognized that
"Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for the broad
remedial purpose of 'ridding the country of racial discrimination in
91. Id. at 254.
92. SEC v. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
93. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 311 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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voting."' 9 4 This broad remedial purpose is evidence that Congress
intended for the VRA to have a real, substantial, and permanent
impact on the status of minority voting rights. Accordingly, courts
should construe the VRA and its provisions liberally to enable it to
achieve its broad goal of eliminating discriminatory voting
practices. "
An interpretation of section 5 that yields a static baseline would
actually narrow the protections of section 5 by lowering the
preclearance threshold. Under a static baseline, a covered
jurisdiction could obtain preclearance for a proposed voting practice
as long as the change would be deemed an improvement in
comparison to the voting practices that were in effect on the
jurisdiction's coverage date in 1964, 1968, or 1972. Any intervening
change-even an improvement in an existing voting practice-
would not raise the preclearance threshold and thus would have no
bearing on the section 5 analysis. Thus, a proposed change to a
voting practice would be entitled to preclearance as long as the
change is not more discriminatory than the practice it seeks to
replace as it existed in 1964, 1968, or 1972. Intervening progress
would be irrelevant; a proposed voting practice would still be
compared only to the relevant practice that was in effect on the
coverage date, even if that practice was no longer in effect at the time
that the change is proposed and had long been replaced by one that
advanced the goals of the VRA. Consequently, the application of a
static baseline would make it impossible for section 5 to fulfill the
broad purpose of the VRA, unless Congress had expected to
eliminate discriminatory voting practices with one broad stroke.
It is more likely, however, that Congress anticipated slow but
steady progress,96 which only a dynamic baseline is equipped to
accomplish. Under the auspices of a dynamic baseline, once a
jurisdiction eliminates and replaces a discriminatory voting practice
with a less discriminatory practice, the baseline shifts to record this
progress and prevent reversion. A static baseline, on the other hand,
94. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)).
95. The Supreme Court acknowledged the breadth of the Voting Rights Act when it
announced that "the Act should be interpreted in a manner that provides 'the broadest possible
scope' in combating racial discrimination." Id. at 403 (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
96. See H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2441.
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would undermine the progress that the VRA has been tasked to
promote because it would enable a covered jurisdiction to revert to a
discriminatory voting practice that had been in effect on the
jurisdiction's coverage date. The application of a static baseline
entails the risk of this phenomenon because a static baseline
effectively creates a "safe harbor" for covered jurisdictions seeking
to reinstate prior discriminatory voting practices: a voting practice
that is discriminatory but resembles one that was in effect on the
jurisdiction's coverage date is nonetheless exempt from the
preclearance requirement because it would not be deemed a change
requiring such preclearance. Ultimately, a static baseline would
enable a covered jurisdiction to legally return to discriminatory
voting practices even if the jurisdiction had already made progressive
changes in accordance with the goals of the VRA. Yet, it is unlikely
that Congress had intended to create this perverse loophole. "
A contrary intent is even more convincing in light of the 2006
amendments to the VRA. Concerned about the possibility of
backsliding, 98 Congress announced that the purpose of the VRA is
"to ensure that the right of all citizens to vote, including the right to
register to vote and cast meaningful votes, is preserved and protected
as guaranteed by the Constitution."99  Thus, Congress explicitly
announced its intent to preserve any progress that has already been
made. A static baseline that permits a covered jurisdiction to return
to prior practices without the obligation to seek preclearance for its
change does not protect intervening progress. But, a dynamic
baseline that shifts with every intervening change would preserve
"the significant gains made by minorities in the last 40 years" "' and
would prevent the backsliding which Congress obviously aimed to
prevent. Whereas a dynamic baseline could facilitate the purpose of
97. On the contrary, there is evidence that Congress intended to prevent covered
jurisdictions from reenacting discriminatory voting practices. H.R. REP. No. 91-397 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3277, 3281 (noting that Congress aimed to prevent covered
jurisdictions from being able to "reimpose the voting and registration requirements that first gave
rise to the [VRA]"). See also discussion infra Part V.C.
98. See discussion infra Part LV.C.
99. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577, 577 (2006)
(emphasis added).
100. Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. at 578.
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the VRA, a static baseline would only frustrate and undermine its
efficacy.
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ILLUSTRATES THAT CONGRESS
INTENDED SECTION 5 TO IMPOSE A DYNAMIC BASELINE
Although the interpretation of a statute starts with the words of
the text, it does not end there. If the meaning of a statute's text is
plainly discernible, then the "plain meaning rule" prohibits reliance
on legislative history or any other forms of extrinsic evidence. 10
But, the bare text of section 5-the plain meaning-is not plainly
discernible. '02 As discussed above, there is ample evidence in the
text that suggests section 5 was aimed to impose a dynamic
baseline, 103 yet the references to the coverage dates and their
inclusion in subsection (a) create some ambiguity as to their precise
meaning and utility. It is precisely this ambiguity that should prompt
the Supreme Court to look beyond the words of the statute in an
effort to discern the congressional intent behind section 5 of the
VRA. A strictly literal interpretation of a statute entails the risk that
the statute, and Congress's intent in enacting it, will be
misinterpreted:
In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the
master. It obviously has the power to correct our mistakes,
but we do the country a disservice when we needlessly
ignore persuasive evidence of Congress' actual purpose and
require it 'to take the time to revisit the matter' and to
restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its
work product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error.
As Judge Learned Hand explained, statutes are likely to be
imprecise. 104
Courts traditionally use legislative history in their interpretation
of statutes instead of relying exclusively on the bare words of the
101. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 42, app. B at 19; see, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1459-63 (2007).
102. See discussion supra Part II.
103. See discussion supra Part II.
104. W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (J. Stevens, dissenting).
Stevens's concern was justified because Congress clearly disagreed with the Supreme Court's
limited interpretation of that provision. Three years after Casey, the Court noted in an opinion by
Justice Stevens that Congress had since amended the relevant statute in response to Casey to
clarify its broader intent. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250 (1994).
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text. 105 Under this approach-the "soft plain meaning rule"-the
plain meaning of the text is considered to be just one among several
sources of evidence used to discern the legislative intent of a
statute. 06 A comprehensive analysis of the section 5 baseline should
consider the legislative history of the VRA because it provides
evidence of what Congress intended to accomplish when it enacted
and amended the statute. 07
The legislative history of section 5 provides compelling
evidence that Congress actually intended to establish a dynamic
baseline. First, the broad goals of the VRA and the categorical
mandate to preclear all voting changes in covered jurisdictions are
inconsistent with the application of a static baseline. Second, the
purpose of stating the coverage dates in section 5 is to freeze, not to
exempt, existing practices, and to ensure that covered jurisdictions
obtain preclearance for any changes that are made after their section
5 coverage date. Third, Congress's concern that covered
jurisdictions may revert to prior discriminatory voting practices
suggests a congressional preference for a dynamic baseline because
it would safeguard prior gains and promote further progress. Finally,
Congress has implicitly ratified Supreme Court precedents that have
consistently applied a dynamic baseline in section 5 cases, even
though Congress had several opportunities to change the statute if it
wanted to alter the Court's future application of the section 5
baseline.
105. See Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age of Textualism: A Practitioner's Guide
to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. REV. 451, 452-53 (2002); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium on Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History Values, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 376 (1990) (explaining that the original intent of a statute can be more
objectively and reliably revealed by the text and the legislative history, as opposed to the text
alone, because such history provides context).
106. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 45, at 233. Although the "old soft plain meaning rule has
become harder" since the Supreme Court began subscribing to new textualism, the Court still
consults extrinsic legislative history. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 226-27 (1994). [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION].
107. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION, supra note 106, at 235 ("Legislative history [is useful to]
explain the reasons for enacting the statute, the structure of the statutory regime and why it was
set up that way, and what at least some original legislators expected the statute to accomplish.");
see also Eskridge, supra note 105, at 369-70, 392 (stating that the Supreme Court considers
authoritative statements in the legislative history to ensure that the law is interpreted in
accordance with congressional intent).
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A. Congress Intended to Eliminate All
Discriminatory Voting Practices
The legislative history of the VRA suggests that Congress
envisioned the application of a dynamic baseline in section 5
preclearance cases. When the VRA was initially proposed and
discussed in Congress, its original purpose was to "eradicate once
and for all the chronic system of racial discrimination which has for
so long excluded so many citizens from the electorate because of the
color of their skin, contrary to the explicit command of the 15th
Amendment." "'2 Congress affirmed this goal during subsequent
VRA extensions and amendments. 109
Congress intended for section 5 to apply broadly to all changes
related to voting. In 1965, the Senate Judiciary Committee
announced that section 5 required preclearance whenever a state or
political subdivision attempted to enforce "a new or changed
requirement." '10 The Committee reinforced this broad application of
section 5 in 1985, explaining that "covered states must preclear all
laws which may affect the electoral process in any way.""' Most
recently in 2006, Congress again announced that section 5 "requires
[covered] jurisdictions ... to preclear all voting changes before they
may be enforced." 112 These legislative expectations with respect to
the VRA are relevant to its interpretation. '
If section 5 were interpreted to impose a static baseline, then a
covered jurisdiction would not have to submit all voting changes for
preclearance. A change that would simply be a reversion to a
practice that had been in effect on the jurisdiction's coverage date
would not need to be precleared because it would not be deemed a
change when compared to the practice in effect on the coverage date.
Thus, a static baseline would create an exemption from the
108. S. REP. No. 89-162 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2540.
109. See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 69 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 91-397 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3277, 3278.
110. S. REP. No. 89-162 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2562 (emphasis
added).
111. S. REP. No. 97-417 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 291 (emphasis added).
112. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 21. The Senate agreed: "Section 5 provides that if a
jurisdiction is covered under section 4(b), then all voting laws in that jurisdiction must be pre-
approved either by the Justice Department or the federal district court for the District of
Columbia." S. REP. No. 109-295, at 5 (2006).
113. Eskridge, supra note 105, at 375.
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preclearance mandate and consequently violate the categorical
mandate that all voting changes in covered jurisdictions must be
submitted for preclearance.
In fact, Congress considered but ultimately rejected creating
such a "safe harbor" for proposed changes that would reinstate a
voting practice that was in effect on the jurisdiction's coverage date.
The Senate Judiciary Committee specifically noted that the broad
scope of section 5 meant that "a change in the voting practice or
procedure may also retain some feature of the previous system, and
all aspects of such a change are within the reach of section 5." 114
Thus, no voting change in a covered jurisdiction is intended to be
exempt from the preclearance inquiry given that the "comparative
analysis under section 5 is intended to be specifically focused on
whether the electoral power of the minority community is more, less,
or just as able to elect a preferred candidate of choice after a voting
change as before." '" The fact that Congress envisioned a proposed
change to be compared to the status quo during the preclearance
inquiry indicates that it intended section to impose a dynamic
baseline.
B. The Coverage Dates Were Meant to Freeze,
Not Exempt, Existing Voting Practices
The legislative history of the VRA suggests that Congress never
intended to exempt the voting practices that were in effect on the
coverage dates from subsequent preclearance inquiries just because it
mentioned these coverage dates in section 5(a). Such an exemption
would imply that Congress approved of these voting practices. But,
in fact, it was the existence of these practices that spurred Congress
to enact the VRA, especially section 5, because it deemed prior
voting rights legislation to be inadequate when it came to sufficiently
combating discriminatory voting practices. 116 In response to the
bleak voting conditions prior to the enactment of the VRA, the
House Judiciary Committee announced, "The burden is too heavy-
the wrong to our citizens is too serious-the damage to our national
conscience is too great not to adopt more effective measures than
114. S. REP. No. 94-295 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 785.
115. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 71 (emphases added).
116. S. REP. No. 89-162 (1965), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2544-45.
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exist today." 117 Clearly, Congress was dissatisfied with the voting
conditions in 1965. Thus, it is illogical and implausible to suggest
that Congress intended to allow covered jurisdictions-the most
egregious violators of the Fifteenth Amendment-to return to 1965
voting practices in the face of intervening changes that may have
already improved the voting conditions for minority citizens. Yet, a
static baseline would enable exactly such an outcome.
It is more likely that by including the coverage dates in section
5(a), Congress intended to denote the three sets of covered
jurisdictions and the dates when all voting practices in these
jurisdictions were frozen pending approval. After its relevant
coverage date, no covered jurisdiction could lawfully change (or
unfreeze) its existing voting practices without preclearance.
Subsequent legislative history affirms this interpretation. In 1975,
the Senate Judiciary Committee explained that "Section 5
preclearance provisions applied to all changes relating to voting
which were to be implemented after November 1, 1964." 18 But, the
application of a static baseline would subvert this legislative intent
because it would allow covered jurisdictions to bypass the
preclearance mandate and revert to potentially discriminatory voting
practices.
C. A Dynamic Baseline Addresses Congressional
Concern About Backsliding
The legislative history of the VRA demonstrates Congress's
constant concern about backsliding in the voting rights arena.
Congress has repeatedly expressed its intent to protect and preserve
any gains already facilitated by the VRA. 19 Congressional intent to
preserve this progress implies it is vulnerable. This concern about
backsliding is strong evidence that Congress intended section 5 to
encompass a dynamic baseline that would prevent regression to prior
discriminatory practices that have since been eradicated in covered
jurisdictions.
117. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2442.
118. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 778 (emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577, 577 (2006)
(stating that the purpose of the VRA is to preserve and protect constitutional voting rights).
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Congress drafted section 5 to prevent covered jurisdictions from
attempting to "reimpose the voting and registration requirements that
first gave rise to the Act," 120 and thereby "restoring the pre-1965
status quo." 121 A dynamic baseline is consistent with Congress's aim
to protect minority voters in covered jurisdictions that may seek to
reinstate discriminatory voting practices that were in effect before
the enactment of the VRA. A static baseline, on the other hand,
would enable a covered jurisdiction to circumvent the preclearance
requirement, and to revert to prior discriminatory practices despite
explicit congressional goals to the contrary.
A dynamic baseline also comports with Congress's recognition
that gains with respect to voting rights are still fragile, even decades
after the enactment of the VRA, and any progress in this area is
difficult to sustain in recalcitrant jurisdictions. 122 Congress has
continuously extended the VRA since its initial enactment in 1965
because it was "concerned about the risk of losing what progress has
already been won." 123 For instance, Congress extended the VRA in
1982 to "insure that the hard-won progress of the past is preserved
and that the effort to achieve full participation for all Americans in
our democracy will continue in the future." 124 But, a static baseline
would jeopardize the fragile gains already made because it would
permit unfettered reversion to prior discriminatory practices.
Ultimately, the application of a static baseline could potentially wipe
out post-1965 progress. A dynamic baseline, on the other hand,
would ensure that covered jurisdictions maintain the improvements
in their voting practices, and would require covered jurisdiction to
build on these improvements.
D. Subsequent Legislative History Shows Congress's
Intent to Continue the Use of a Dynamic Baseline
Thus far, section 5 has been interpreted to impose a dynamic
baseline, and the VRA's subsequent legislative history supports the
continued application of a dynamic baseline. 125 First, the Supreme
120. H.R. REP. NO. 91-397 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3277, 3281.
121. Id.
122. See S. REP. No. 97-417 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 187.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 181.
125. See HASEN, supra note 10, at 32.
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Court has consistently interpreted section 5 to impose a dynamic
baseline, 126 and Congress has not once amended section 5 to alter
this interpretation of the baseline. Thus, congressional silence on
this issue indicates that, at the very least, Congress has acquiesced to
the Court's interpretation of the section 5 baseline. Second, although
Congress has amended and reenacted the VRA on several occasions,
the text addressing the actual baseline in section 5 remained
unchanged every time the VRA was amended. '27 Congress's
decision not to amend this text is evidence that Congress has ratified
the Court's interpretation that section 5 imposes a dynamic baseline.
1. Congress Acquiesced to a Dynamic Baseline
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted section 5 to
impose a dynamic baseline. 128 Congressional silence on the Court's
interpretation of a statute is tantamount to congressional approval
with respect to this issue. 129 By not amending the VRA to alter the
way in which the Court interprets and applies the section 5 baseline,
Congress has implicitly acquiesced to this interpretation of the
baseline. 130 If Congress had disagreed with the Court's
determination that section 5 imposes a dynamic baseline, it would
have duly amended the VRA to indicate its disapproval of this
interpretation and to redefine the section 5 baseline.
In fact, it is not unusual for Congress to take such decisive
action with respect to section 5. Congress has previously reacted to
the Court's misconstruction of the VRA, 131 and it is conceivable that
Congress would have reacted similarly if it deemed the Court to have
misinterpreted the section 5 baseline. To date, Congress has
disapproved of three Supreme Court decisions concerning the VRA.
126. See discussion infra Part V.
127. See, e.g., Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533 (1973) (noting that Congress made
no substantive changes in 1970 when it extended section 5 for five more years).
128. See discussion infra Part V.
129. The acquiescence rule was followed by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n. 7 (1987) and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
279 (1972).
130. HASEN, supra note 10, at 32.
131. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.
(Bossier Parish 11), 528 U.S. 320 (2000); City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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In 1982, Congress overrode the Court's limited construction of
section 2 132 of the VRA in City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden. ' In
Bolden, the Court raised the burden of proof for plaintiffs alleging
the existence of discriminatory voting practices in violation of
section 2 of the VRA. Before Bolden, a plaintiff only needed to
demonstrate that the challenged voting practice was discriminatory in
effect. 134 After Bolden, however, such proof was no longer
sufficient; a plaintiff seeking to prevail on a section 2 cause of action
also had to establish that the voting practice was the result of a
discriminatory intent. "' The Court's reassessment of section 2 in
Bolden made it significantly harder for plaintiffs to prevail on a
claim pursuant to section 2 because of the difficulty of proving
intent. 136 Following Bolden, however, Congress amended section 2
to restore its original function "' and "to make clear that plaintiffs
need not prove a discriminatory purpose in the adoption or
maintenance of the challenged system of practice in order to
establish a violation." 138 To prevail on a section 2 claim, a plaintiff
could establish that the allegedly discriminatory practice was
discriminatory in either effect or intent. "'
More recently, Congress disapproved of two Supreme Court
decisions that weakened the impact of section 5 14 -Bossier Parish
II and Georgia v. Ashcroft-in the course of amending and
reauthorizing the VRA in 2006. 141 According to the House Judiciary
132. S. REp. No. 97-417 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 178-79.
133. 446 U.S. 55. For further discussion of Bolden, see HASEN, supra note 10, at 2, 18, 31.
134. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 71.
135. Id. at 66.
136. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 193 ("The Conmittee has concluded that this intent test places an
unacceptably difficult burden on [minority] plaintiffs.").
137. Id. ("Requiring proof of a discriminatory purpose is inconsistent with the original intent
and subsequent legislative history of section 2.").
138. Id. at 205. A plaintiff could either establish intent or prove that the challenged practice
had a discriminatory result by denying minority access to political process or diluting the
minority vote. Id. at 205-06. Section 2 currently reads, in relevant part:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote ....
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
139. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 200 ("Thus, it is clear that, prior to Bolden, plaintiffs in dilution
cases could prevail by showing either discriminatory results or intent ... .
140. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 65 (2006).
141. Id. at 5.
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Committee Report, these two decisions "sharply conflict with the
intent of Congress," 142 and the 2006 amendments were drafted to
specifically restore the original function of section 5.
In Bossier Parish II, the Court limited the scope of the
preclearance inquiry by holding that "Section 5 prevents nothing but
backsliding." 143 Congress disagreed with the Court's interpretation,
explaining that preclearance of a voting change that is "not
technically retrogressive" but is nevertheless discriminatory is
"inconsistent with the clear purposes of the Voting Rights Act." 144
Congress amended section 5 accordingly to clarify that "any
discriminatory purpose" 145 would violate the preclearance provision
because "[v]oting changes that 'purposefully' keep minority groups
'in their place' have no role in our electoral process and are precisely
the types of changes Section 5 is intended to bar." 146
In Georgia v. Ashcroft, 147 the Court again limited the protections
of section 5, and Congress again explicitly disapproved of this
construction. In this case, the Court held that section 5 permits a
covered state to determine for itself whether a proposed voting
change will have a retrogressive effect on minorities by considering
the impact of the proposed change on the state's chosen theory of
effective representation. 148 The Court explained that a state may
evaluate effective minority representation by examining either the
number of majority-minority districts-where the election of a
minority group's preferred candidate is "virtually guaranteed"-or
the number of influence districts-where minority voters may not be
able to elect their preferred candidate but can "play a substantial, if
not decisive, role in the electoral process." 149 Based on its chosen
theory of representation, a covered state can assess the impact of a
redistricting proposal on either its majority-minority districts or its
influence districts. The Court emphasized that section 5 does not
require a covered state to use either of these measures, and instead
142. Id. at 65.
143. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish I1), 528 U.S. 320, 335 (2000).
144. H.R. RE. No. 109-478, at 67.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(c) (2006).
146. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 68.
147. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
148. Id. at 479, 480-483.
149. Id.
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"gives the States the flexibility to choose one theory of effective
representation over the other." IS' By dismissing the importance of
majority-minority districts in the preclearance inquiry, the Court
effectively decided that preclearance no longer depended on the
impact that a voting change would have on a minority group's ability
to elect its preferred candidates of choice. '
But, Congress disagreed and intervened. In 2006, Congress
amended section 5 152 to also emphasize that a minority group's
ability to elect its preferred candidate of choice "is the relevant factor
to be evaluated when determining whether a voting change has a
retrogressive effect." "' To explain its decision to amend section 5,
Congress noted that "the gains made by minority communities in
districts represented by elected officials of the minority
communities' choice would be jeopardized if the retrogression
standard, as altered by the Supreme Court in Georgia, remains
uncorrected." 15' Accordingly, Congress amended section 5 to reflect
this correction.
Therefore, subsequent legislation with respect to the VRA
demonstrates that Congress does not silently acquiesce to the
Supreme Court's interpretations of this statute if it deems them to be
incorrect. Yet, Congress has not intervened to alter the Court's
interpretation of the section 5 baseline. The absence of Congress's
disapproval is evidence that the application of a dynamic baseline is
an accurate reflection of congressional intent concerning section 5.
2. Congress Ratified a Dynamic Baseline
Congress has not only acquiesced to the Court's interpretation of
the section 5 baseline, but it has also effectively ratified this
interpretation through subsequent reenactments of the VRA. When
Congress reenacts a statute, it incorporates settled interpretations of
the statute by default. 155 Unless it expresses a contrary intention,
150. Id. at 482.
151. Id. at 479, 482.
152. Section 5 gained three subsections in the 2006 amendments, subsections (b), (c), and (d),
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c(b), (c), and (d) (2006), respectively. For the text of subsections
(b), (c), and (d), see supra notes 73, 79, and 80 and accompanying text.
153. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 71 (2006) (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 70.
155. EsKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 42, app. B at 26 (noting that the reenactment rule of
interpretation is to incorporate settled interpretations Congress did not expressly change).
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"Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decisions to
stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has
clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively." 156 The
implicit incorporation of established interpretations is especially
evident when Congress has spoken numerous times on a given
statute and thus had numerous opportunities to revise the Court's
existing interpretations. 117
Thus far, Congress has reenacted the VRA four times, and each
time it has declined the opportunity to alter the Court's established
baseline interpretation. If "Congress disagreed with the
interpretation of § 5. .. , it had ample opportunity to amend the
statute." 158 But, because Congress did not address the Court's
application of a dynamic baseline, Congress implicitly incorporated
this interpretation of section 5 in the course of reenacting the
VRA. 1
59
Congress's inaction is especially compelling given that the most
recent reenactment of the VRA was supported by "one of the most
extensive legislative records in the Committee on the Judiciary's
history," 160 but did not address the baseline issue at all. 161 There is
no legislative history to suggest that the section 5 baseline was even
a topic for deliberation. Thus, through its affirmative inaction,
Congress enacted the Court's interpretation of the section 5
baseline. 162
The authoritative clout of legislative history is generally
debatable. But, given the evolution of the VRA, its extensive
156. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972).
157. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION, supra note 106, at 243-44.
158. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533 (1973) (noting that Congress made no
substantive changes in 1970 when it extended section 5 for five more years).
159. See HASEN, supra note 10, at 32 ("As for whether the Court properly interpreted the
scope of section 5 of the act, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act a number of times without
amending section 5, suggesting that at least subsequent Congresses were not dissatisfied with the
Court's approach in Allen.").
160. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 5 (2006).
161. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 42, app. B at 28 (stating that the canon referred to as "[t]he
dog didn't bark" presumes that the prior legal rule should be retained if the rule was not
mentioned in legislative deliberations and if no changes to the rule arose).
162. But see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001) (questioning ratification
arguments if Congress "has not comprehensively revised a statutory scheme but has made only
isolated amendments").
Spring 2009] THE VOTING RIGHTS A CT
legislative history merits consideration. 163 The VRA's legislative
history is replete with evidence that Congress intended for section 5
to apply to all proposed voting changes in covered jurisdictions.
There is no evidence that Congress intended to exempt any proposed
changes from the preclearance mandate. Furthermore, congressional
acquiescence and ratification of the Court's use of a dynamic
baseline is persuasive evidence that Congress deemed this
interpretation of section 5 to be the correct interpretation. "6 If the
Chief Justice ignores the VRA's legislative history, he risks
announcing an incorrect interpretation of the section 5 baseline. 165
V. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY APPLIED
A DYNAMIC BASELINE IN SECTION 5 CASES
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue of
whether the baseline in section 5 of the VRA is static or dynamic.
But, the Court has consistently applied a dynamic baseline in section
5 cases. Thus, the Court's adjudication of section 5 cases suggests
that the Court has presumed that section 5 imposes a dynamic
baseline. 166 First, the Court has provided in dicta guidelines about
the application of section 5 that presume a dynamic baseline.
Second, the Court has looked to the most recent voting practices
163. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 42, app. B at 27 (noting that statutory history-or the
formal evolution of a statute as Congress amends it over the years-is always potentially
relevant); ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETATION, supra note 106, at 252-56.
164. The Supreme Court previously resorted to legislative history to aid in its interpretation
and application of section 5. See, e.g., Dougherty County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S.
32, 47 (1978) ("[A] fair reading of the legislative history compels the conclusion that Congress
was determined in the 1975 extension of the Act to provide some mechanism for coping with all
potentially discriminatory enactments whose source and forms it could not anticipate but whose
impact on the electoral process could be significant."); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544, 570 (1969) ("[The Court is] compelled to resort to the legislative history to determine
whether, in light of the articulated purposes of the legislation, Congress intended that the statute
apply to the particular cases in question.").
165. Eskridge, supra note 105, at 375 (explaining that legislative history is useful as an
authoritative context that enables the Supreme Court to choose the correct interpretation of a
statute among alternative meanings).
166. The interpretation of statutes by the Supreme Court is afforded a very strong
presumption of correctness. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO.
L. J. 1361, 1362 (1988). Unlike the Constitution, a statute can be more readily changed by
Congress if it determines that the Supreme Court has misinterpreted the purpose of the statute.
Id. ("The Court applies a relaxed, or weaker, form of that presumption when it reconsiders its
constitutional precedents, because the difficulty of amending the Constitution makes the Court
the only effective resort for changing obsolete constitutional doctrine. Statutory precedents, on
the other hand, often enjoy a super-strong presumption of correctness.").
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when determining whether preclearance of a given voting change is
appropriate. Third, the non-retrogression standard that the Court
created to determine whether a change merits preclearance is
consistent with a dynamic baseline.
A. The Supreme Court's Preclearance Analysis
Presumes a Dynamic Baseline
Although the Court has never decided the issue of whether the
section 5 baseline is static or dynamic, it has addressed the baseline
in dicta while resolving multiple section 5 cases. 167 Collectively,
such dicta provide strong evidence that the Court has presumed
section 5 to impose a dynamic baseline.
First, the Court has emphasized the significance of the status
quo in the preclearance analysis. The Court explained that "the
baseline is the status quo that is proposed to be changed." 168
Accordingly, the Court explained that pursuant to section 5, "[t]o
determine whether there have been changes with respect to voting,
[the Court] must compare the challenged practices with those in
existence before they were adopted." 169 This approach by the Court
is consistent with the application of a dynamic baseline. A static
baseline, on the other hand, would likely conflict with the Court's
approach to preclearance cases because it would require a
comparison between a proposed practice and the practice that was in
effect on the given jurisdiction's coverage date. Unless the practice
that was in effect on the jurisdiction's coverage date has not changed
and is still the status quo when the proposed change is submitted for
preclearance, a static baseline would require a comparative analytical
approach that differs from the one that the Court has already
announced and applied in section 5 cases.
Second, the Court's inquiry into intervening changes to voting
practices during its preclearance analysis also indicates that the Court
has presumed the existence of a dynamic baseline. In the absence of
a dynamic baseline, the Court would have no reason to examine an
intervening change to a particular voting practice that has been
precleared and enacted; a static baseline would only require the
167. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish I1), 528 U.S. 320 (2000);
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
168. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added).
169. Presley, 502 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
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Court to consider whether the proposed change was different from
the practice that was in effect in 1964, 1968, or 1972. However, the
Court has explained that section 5's "date of November 1, 1964
often ... is not directly relevant, for differences once precleared...
become part of the baseline standard." 17' The Court even
emphasized that "[a]bsent relevant intervening changes, the [VRA]
requires [the Court] to use practices in existence on November 1,
1964, as [its] standard of comparison." 17' Thus, the relevant voting
practice on a jurisdiction's coverage date is only used as the baseline
in the absence of applicable intervening changes.
Finally, the Court announced in the most recent VRA case,
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder, 172 decided during the 2008 Term, that section 5 should be
broadly interpreted to apply to all proposed changes that relate to
voting in covered jurisdictions. Specifically, the Court declared that
"Section 5 goes beyond the prohibition of the Fifteenth Amendment
by suspending all changes to state election law-however
innocuous-until they have been precleared by federal authorities in
Washington, D.C." 173 The fact that the Court considers section 5 to
have suspended all voting practices that were in effect on a covered
jurisdiction's coverage date pending federal approval necessarily
implies that these practices cannot serve as permanent comparative
benchmarks; after all, these practices, too, are subject to the
mandates of section 5. Thus, the application of a static baseline
would be at odds with the Court's most recent articulation of the
function of section 5.
B. The Supreme Court Consistently Compares
a Proposed Change to the Status Quo
Since the enactment of the VRA, the Supreme Court has
consistently looked to the most recent practice that is in effect when
170. Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 281 (1997) (emphasis added).
171. Presley, 502 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
172. 129 S.Ct. 2504 (2009). Most of this Article was written before the Supreme Court
decided this case. Although the Court had the opportunity to decide more broadly the
constitutionality of the VRA, the Court instead held that the covered jurisdiction at issue-the
utility district-had an independent right to seek bailout from section 5 coverage because "the
Voting Rights Act permits all political subdivisions, including the district in this case, to seek
relief from its preclearance requirements." Id. at 2508, 2516-17.
173. Id. at 2511.
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a proposed voting practice is submitted for preclearance. Looking to
the most recent practice at issue is predicated on the presumption that
the section 5 baseline is dynamic.
The Court's focus on the status quo was especially evident in
City of Monroe v. United States. 174 The issue in this case was
whether city elections should be based on a majority or a plurality
vote. 17' The city had become subject to section 5 in 1965, 176 and on
its coverage date, plurality voting was the practice that was in effect
in this jurisdiction. 77 However, a 1968 Georgia state law established
a default rule that required majority voting in cities that did not
specify in their charters a preference for plurality voting. 17' This law
was precleared and enacted, and it applied to the City of Monroe
because its charter did not specify a preference for plurality voting. 171
Then, in 1990, the City of Monroe submitted a request for
preclearance to add the majority-vote requirement to its city charter,
but the attorney general refused to preclear this proposed change. "'o
On appeal, the Supreme Court used the precleared 1968 code as the
baseline and, based on this comparison, held that the City of Monroe
was entitled to preclearance. ' However, had the Court applied a
static baseline, it would have compared the proposed change to the
practice that was in effect on Monroe's coverage date-plurality
voting.
Additionally, the Court's application of a dynamic baseline is
particularly significant in redistricting cases. Changes that alter the
composition of districts and shift boundaries have an impact on
voting and thus must be precleared before they can take effect.
Redistricting usually occurs once every ten years, following the
decennial census report. 182 If section 5 were to impose a static
baseline to redistricting proposals, then each proposal that is
submitted after 1965 would have to be compared to the 1964, 1968,
174. 522 U.S. 34 (1997).
175. Id. at 35-37.
176. Id. at 35.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 35-37.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 36-37.
181. Id. at 38-39.
182. See supra notes 82 and 83 and accompanying text.
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or 1972 population data and resulting voting-district plans. Yet, the
Court has never applied a static baseline to redistricting proposals.
On the contrary, the Court has presumed without discussion that the
appropriate preclearance analysis of redistricting proposals requires a
comparison between the proposed redistricting plan and the current
voting-district plan.
In Abrams v. Johnson, i83 for example, the Court decided that a
1982 plan was the appropriate benchmark to which a new
redistricting plan should be compared. ' More recently, in Georgia
v. Ashcroft, ' the Court determined that Georgia's proposed
redistricting plan should be compared to the prior 1997 district
plan. 186 In fact, the issue of whether the 1965 district plan should be
considered did not arise at all: "All parties ...concede[d] that the
1997 plan [was] the benchmark plan for this litigation because it was
in effect at the time of the 2001 redistricting effort." 187 Thus, in
redistricting cases, the Court automatically applies a dynamic
baseline without hesitation. The Court's application of a dynamic
baseline in these cases is significant beyond the redistricting context
because there is no indication that a different baseline analysis
should apply to voting changes that do not implicate voting districts.
C. The Supreme Court's Non-Retrogression Standard
Is Consistent with a Dynamic Baseline
About ten years after the enactment of the VRA, the Supreme
Court announced in Beer v. United States 188 that the purpose of the
VRA "has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes
would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of
racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise." 89 The purpose of this prohibition against
retrogression is to preserve the gains that had already been made in
the area of minority voting rights, 190 and "to maintain the voting
183. 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
184. Id. at 97.
185. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
186. Id. at 469.
187. Id.
188. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
189. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
190. Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV.
903, 922 (2008).
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strength of minority voters at its present level in the sixteen states
covered in whole or in part by § 5." 191 The Court adopted this non-
retrogression standard to determine whether a covered jurisdiction is
entitled to obtain preclearance for any given change related to voting
that it seeks to enact. 192
The Court's implementation of the non-retrogression standard
illustrates that the preclearance analysis is actually bifurcated. First,
the Court uses the baseline to determine if a proposed practice
triggers the section 5 inquiry and must be precleared; section 5
requires preclearance only if the proposed practice represents a
change from the prior practice. Second, the Court uses the baseline
to determine if the proposed change merits preclearance; only a non-
retrogressive change may be precleared. The Court has only
articulated the standard for assessing the second of these two prongs:
"Retrogression, by definition, requires a comparison of a [covered]
jurisdiction's new voting plan with its existing plan." 193 But, by
defining the hurdle that a covered jurisdiction must overcome to
establish that its proposed change to a voting practice is entitled to
preclearance-demonstrating non-retrogression-the Court has
simultaneously established the trigger for a preclearance inquiry-
when a proposed change in a voting practice is a change that must be
precleared. The Court's use of a non-retrogression standard
''necessarily implies that the [covered] jurisdiction's existing plan is
the benchmark against which the 'effect' of voting changes is
measured." 194 Thus, to assess the second prong, the Court must look
to the status quo and apply a dynamic baseline. It follows that the
first threshold prong requires the same analysis. '9' Congress has
never overturned the non-retrogression standard, 96 so it remains
191. Id. at 937.
192. Id.
193. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish 1), 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997).
194. Id.
195. A static baseline would not permit a comparison of the proposed practice with the
existing practice, or a comparison of its effects on the existing levels of minority representation.
In fact, this approach would only allow the Supreme Court to focus on the relevant practices in
effect on the jurisdiction's coverage date.
196. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) ("The
normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.") (citing Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979)).
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integral to the preclearance analysis and its use affirms the
application of a dynamic baseline.
Accordingly, judicial precedents demonstrate that the Supreme
Court has presumed that section 5 imposes a dynamic baseline. This
presumption is apparent in the Court's explanation of the
preclearance inquiry and its consideration of the status quo and
intervening changes. This presumption is also apparent in the non-
retrogression standard that the Court created to assess whether
proposed changes merit preclearance. The Chief Judge's
reinterpretation of section 5 to impose a static baseline would depart
from the Court's settled adjudication of preclearance cases.
VI. THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSISTENTLY APPLIES
A DYNAMIC BASELINE IN SECTION 5 CASES
Section 5 of the VRA requires a covered jurisdiction to obtain
preclearance for any change to a voting practice that it seeks to enact.
To obtain the necessary preclearance, a covered jurisdiction can
either seek a declaratory judgment from the U.S. district court for the
District of Columbia, or alternatively, submit its change to the U.S.
attorney general at the U.S. Department of Justice. 197 The VRA
empowers the U.S. attorney general to administer section 5. To
ensure the consistent application of section 5 in every preclearance
case, 9' the Department of Justice has published guidelines for the
administration of the preclearance process by its attorneys general.
These guidelines have been codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations. "' The interpretation by the Department of Justice
directs the attorney general to apply a dynamic baseline, and this
interpretation is entitled to deference by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. The Preclearance Guidelines Followed by the Attorney
General Direct the Application of a Dynamic Baseline
The preclearance guidelines established by the Department of
Justice that interpret and implement section 5 of the VRA instruct the
197. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
198. Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REv.
1179, 12 15 (noting that the Voting Rights Act requires the attorney general and the district court
for the District of Columbia to apply the same section 5 preclearance standard).
199. The preclearance guidelines are codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 in the Code of Federal
Regulations as Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
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attorney general to use what can only be described as a dynamic
baseline when determining whether a proposed change to a voting
practice is entitled to preclearance.
First, the attorney general must use the last legally enforceable
practice as the comparative benchmark for determining preclearance
eligibility. Pursuant to the guidelines, the attorney general compares
"the submitted change to the voting practice or procedure in effect at
the time of the submission" 211 to determine whether a change will be
retrogressive. The guidelines instruct the attorney general to use as
its benchmark "the last legally enforceable practice or procedure
used by the jurisdiction." 201' The attorney general cannot use a fixed
baseline-the baseline is necessarily determined at the time that a
proposed change is submitted for preclearance. On the contrary, the
guidelines instruct the attorney general to consider the status quo
when assessing the retrogressive impact of a proposed change, such
that the attorney general must also use the status quo to determine
whether a proposed change requires preclearance in the first place.
This presumption is bolstered by the fact that under certain
circumstances, a covered jurisdiction is required to submit to the
attorney general "a clear statement of the change explaining the
difference between the submitted change and the prior law or
practice, or explanatory materials adequate to disclose . . . the
difference between the prior and proposed situation with respect to
voting." 2 02  Thus, whenever a covered jurisdiction seeks to obtain
preclearance for a proposed voting practice, the attorney general
focuses only on the most recent practice that corresponds to this
change, not the relevant voting practice that was in effect on the
jurisdiction's coverage date. This analysis is consistent with the
application of a dynamic baseline.
Second, the guidelines by the Department of Justice state that
covered jurisdictions must submit for preclearance all changes with
respect to voting made after their respective coverage dates. 203
200. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28
C.F.R. § 51.54(b)(1) (1987).
201. Id.
202. Id. § 51.27(c).
203. Id. § 51.4(b) ("Section 5 requires the preclearance of changes affecting voting made
since the date used for the determination of coverage. For each covered jurisdiction that date is
one of the following: November 1, 1964; November 1, 1968; or November 1, 1972.").
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Accordingly, any change to a voting practice is subject to section 5
preclearance, including "[a]ny change affecting voting, even though
it appears to be minor or indirect, returns to a prior practice or
procedure, ostensibly expands voting rights, or is designed to remove
the elements that caused objection by the Attorney General to a prior
submitted change." 2 4 This categorical mandate leaves no room for
exceptions, and no exceptions are listed in the guidelines.
Third, the Department of Justice implicitly rejects the use of a
static baseline that is based on the jurisdiction's coverage date by
explicitly prohibiting a covered jurisdiction from reenacting a voting
practice that was in effect on the jurisdiction's coverage date unless
the proposed reenactment is precleared. Because a voting change
must still be precleared "even though it . . returns to a prior practice
or procedure," 205 this change is not exempt from the preclearance
requirement, as it is administered by the attorney general. When
these guidelines were revised, the Department of Justice clarified that
the non-exempt status of these prior voting practices is intended "to
make explicit that a voting change that returns a jurisdiction to a
practice that was previously in effect (e.g., to that in use on
November 1, 1964) is subject to the preclearance requirement."2 6
Accordingly, the application of a static baseline would be
inconsistent with the guidelines that the attorneys general apply
when administering section 5.
B. The Interpretation of Section 5 by the Department
of Justice Merits Judicial Deference
The interpretation and application of section 5 by the
Department of Justice, manifested in the preclearance guidelines,
merits judicial deference. The seminal case that established how the
Supreme Court evaluates the propriety of an agency's interpretation
of a statute that it is instructed to administer is Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 207 In Chevron, the
Supreme Court adopted a two-pronged test to determine whether an
204. Id. § 51.12.
205. Id.
206. Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 488 (Jan. 6, 1987) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1987).
207. 467 U.S. 837.
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agency's interpretation merits judicial deference. 208 First, the court
must determine if Congress has "directly spoken to the precise
question at issue"20 9 which the agency has purported to answer
through its interpretation. "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,"2 ' and
any interpretation by the agency that is contrary to the expressed
congressional intent is unacceptable. But, "if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." 2"1 Thus, if the congressional intent of a
statute is not clear, then the Court should defer to the agency's
reasonable interpretation. 212
The guidelines promulgated by the Department of Justice would
survive judicial scrutiny under either test. First, there is persuasive
evidence of Congress's intent for section 5 to impose a dynamic
baseline. As discussed above, the text of section 5, as well as its
purpose and legislative history, collectively demonstrate this
intent. 2' Accordingly, the guidelines merit judicial approval
because they are consistent with congressional intent.
Second, to the extent that the Court determines that Congress
has not spoken clearly on the issue of the section 5 baseline, the
guidelines by the Department of Justice merit judicial deference
because they embody a permissible construction of section 5. As
discussed above, the text of section 5 alone is arguably ambiguous
with respect to the preclearance baseline. 24 Thus, whether
intentional or implicit, there may be a legislative gap that must be
filled. If "Congress ... delegated policy-making responsibilities"2 1 5
to an agency, and a statute has authorized the agency to adjudicate or
create rules to implement the statute's provisions, the agency's
208. Id. at 842-43.
209. Id. at 842.
210. Id. at 842-43.
211. Id. at 843 (emphasis added).
212. Id.
213. See discussion supra Parts I, III, and IV.
214. See discussion supra Part II.
215. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
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interpretation of this statute warrants consideration. 26 Section 5
specifically instructs the attorney general to implement the
preclearance process by examining submissions, assessing
objections, and granting preclearance when appropriate. 27 By
entrusting the attorney general to implement the preclearance
mandate, Congress has granted the Department of Justice policy-
making authority to guide its attorneys general in the administration
of section 5.
Even if the Court disagrees with this interpretation, "a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency."218
In fact, the Court has declared that it favors deference to an agency's
reasonable interpretation even if it entails resolving an ambiguity or
conflict in the statute, and this interpretation should not be disturbed
"unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the
accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned."2 19
Here, there is ample evidence that Congress intended section 5 to
impose a dynamic baseline, such that an interpretation by the
Department of Justice that is consistent with this intent is sufficiently
reasonable and warrants judicial deference. Thus, the Court may not
substitute the Chief Justice's reinterpretation of section 5 that yields
a static baseline in place of the dynamic baseline applied by the
attorneys general in accordance with the guidelines established by
the Department of Justice.
It is noteworthy that the Court has already acknowledged the
propriety of deferring to the interpretation of section 5 by the
Department of Justice. Although a dynamic baseline enables a broad
application of section 5, the Court has previously explained that
"[g]iven the central role of the Attorney General in formulating and
implementing § 5, [its] interpretation of [the VRA's] scope is entitled
to particular deference." 22  Since the enactment of the VRA, the
Court has also upheld other interpretations by the Department of
Justice that are relevant to the preclearance inquiry, thereby
according this agency substantial deference with respect to its
216. Id.
217. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
218. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
219. Id. at 844-45 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961)).
220. Dougherty County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 39 (1978).
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interpretation of section 5. 221 Therefore, the interpretation of the
section 5 baseline by the Department of Justice merits judicial
deference.
VII. THE UNFAVORABLE IMPLICATIONS OF REINTERPRETING
SECTION 5 TO IMPOSE A STATIC BASELINE
A reinterpretation of section 5 that imposes that use of a static
baseline carries with it unfavorable policy implications. Section 5 of
the VRA is considered to be one of the most influential civil rights
statutes because it has "contributed to the gains thus far achieved in
minority political participation."2 22 But, it has not yet outgrown its
usefulness. During the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA, Congress
affirmed the continued utility of section 5 in "protecting minority
voters from devices and schemes that continue to be employed by
covered States and jurisdictions."223 Extensive research has revealed
that rampant and ongoing discrimination against minority voters has
persisted in covered and uncovered jurisdictions since 1982. 224
Examples of such discriminatory practices in covered jurisdictions
include the following: harassment of African-American voters by
white poll managers; 225 a limit imposed by county officials on the
number of voter registration forms provided to Native Americans; 226
the consolidation of multiple voting precincts at an all-white civic
club; 227 and a town mayor's refusal to provide required registration
forms to African-American city council candidates. 228 This evidence
illustrates the continued need for a rigorous preclearance procedure
221. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 281 (1999). In City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 171 (1980), the Supreme Court supported a liberal interpretation of
section 5 regarding the sixty-day deadline for the attorney general to object to a covered
jurisdiction's proposed change: "We agree with the Attorney General that the purposes of the Act
and its implementing regulations would be furthered if the 60-day period provided by 28 C.F.R. §
51.3(d) were interpreted to commence anew when additional information is supplied by the
submitting jurisdiction on its own accord." Id.
222. S. REP. No. 94-295 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 785; see also
OVERTON, supra note 16, at 94, 98 ("Perhaps the most important part of the act, however, was the
Section 5 preclearance provision.... Section 5 worked wonders.")
223. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 21 (2006).
224. Ellen Katz et. al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 678-91 (2006).
225. Id. at 678-80.
226. Id. at 680-82.
227. Id. at 683.
228. Id. at 683-84.
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in covered jurisdictions that is well-equipped to address and curb
such ever-present discrimination against minority citizens. But, the
use of a static baseline would reduce the protective scope of section 5
and would jeopardize the progress that has already been made since
1965. Moreover, if section 5 is narrowed in scope, then minority
citizens will have to rely more extensively on section 2 to protect
their Fifteenth Amendment right to vote. 229 Unfortunately, section 2
cannot sufficiently protect minority citizens from contemporary
discriminatory voting practices. 230
A. A Static Baseline Would Weaken Section 5 and
Endanger the Progress Already Made
The Supreme Court recognized early on that "[t]he Voting
Rights Act is aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state
regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to
vote because of their race." 23' Congress is still concerned that the
"vestiges of discrimination in voting" continue to exist long after the
"first generation" barriers have been addressed.232 Second-
generation discriminatory practices typically include vote dilution
attempts by covered jurisdictions to limit the voice of minority voters
through such methods as redistricting and at-large elections. 233 But,
a static baseline can only address first-generation discrimination. 234
The more subtle and invidious second-generation barriers could still
pass preclearance scrutiny as long as they are deemed to be no more
discriminatory than the relevant practice that was in effect on the
jurisdiction's coverage date. Of course, a dynamic baseline would
facilitate the denial of preclearance for any discriminatory voting
practice in a covered jurisdiction that still seeks to prevent minority
voters from fully participating in the electoral process.
229. See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 57 (2006).
230. See id. (discussing Congress's concern about the inadequacy of section 2 to sufficiently
protect minority voters).
231. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969).
232. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577, 577 (2006).
233. Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the
Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2007).
234. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 12-18 (noting the progress that the Voting Rights Act made
regarding first-generation barriers, including increased voter registration and turnout, and an
increased number of African-American elected officials).
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Moreover, the use of a static baseline would enable the
reemergence of the discriminatory voting practices that were in
effect when a jurisdiction became covered under section 5, even if
those practices have since been eradicated and replaced by non-
discriminatory alternatives. As discussed above, a static baseline
would create a "safe harbor" for these practices and exempt them
from the preclearance inquiry in the event that covered jurisdictions
seek to reinstate such practices. 235 Ironically, covered jurisdictions
were selected for section 5 coverage precisely because they most
egregiously violated the voting rights of minority citizens.236
Allowing these chronic offenders of the Fifteenth Amendment to
reenact voting practices that caused them to be subject to section 5
preclearance in the first place defies reason. It also defies the broad
policy goals that Congress intended section 5 to meet. 237 By
enabling covered jurisdictions to revert to prior discriminatory voting
practices, a static baseline has the potential to unravel years of
progress, leaving minority voters in no better position than they were
in when the VRA was first enacted in 1965.
B. Section 2 Cannot Sufficiently Protect Minority Citizens
from Discriminatory Voting Practices
If section 5 were to be reinterpreted to impose a static-instead
of a dynamic-baseline, then minority voters would have to rely
more heavily on section 2 to combat the ongoing discrimination that
has yet to be eradicated, as well as the subtle discriminatory voting
practices that have emerged in the wake of the VRA. These
discriminatory voting practices would likely remain unaddressed if
section 5 were to impose only a static baseline. Unfortunately,
section 2 is not equipped to address these residual issues as well as
section 5 is intended and able to-but only to the extent that section
5 imposes a dynamic baseline.
Congress is completely aware of the inadequacies of section 2.
While reenacting the VRA in 2006, Congress emphasized its doubts
about the ability of section 2 to sufficiently protect minority voters
from ever-present discrimination. 238 Unlike section 2, section 5 is a
235. See discussion supra Part V.A.
236. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
237. See discussion supra Part III.
238. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 57.
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prospective measure that places the burden on covered jurisdictions
to show that proposed changes related to voting would not
discriminate against minority voters. Consequently, section 5 has
proven to be an effective deterrent against discriminatory voting
practices. It is precisely these functions that distinguish section 5
from section 2, and make section 5 (and its imposition of a dynamic
baseline) indispensable to the enforcement of the Fifteenth
Amendment.
1. Section 5 Prevents Discriminatory Practices
Section 5 prevents the emergence of discriminatory voting
practices because it is inherently a prospective measure. Section 5
was enacted to "allow the Federal Government and courts to stay one
step ahead of jurisdictions with a documented history of
discrimination against minority voters."239 Its aim is to prevent the
emergence or reemergence of discriminatory practices, not to remove
them after they have already been implemented and have violated the
voting rights of minority citizens. This is because a covered
jurisdiction must seek preclearance before it can legally implement a
voting practice. Section 5 protects minority voters ex ante from the
implementation of unconstitutional voting practices. For this reason,
Congress has hailed section 5 as one of the VRA's "vital
prophylactic tools, protecting minority voters from devices and
schemes that continue to be employed by covered States and
jurisdictions." 240
Section 2, by contrast, is a retrospective measure. Although it is
not limited to covered jurisdictions, the primary function of section 2
is to provide individual plaintiffs with a cause of action against
jurisdictions that employ discriminatory voting practices. The
protections of section 2 are not triggered until after a discriminatory
voting practice has been implemented and its use has allegedly
violated the voting rights of minority citizens. A section 2 claim is
necessarily predicated on the assertion by an individual plaintiff or a
class of plaintiffs, or alternatively, by the Department of Justice, 241
239. Id. at 35.
240. Id. at 21.
241. See, e.g., http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/litigation/caselist.php#sec2cases (listing cases
filed by the United States against jurisdictions that have allegedly violated section 2) (last visited
Sept. 24, 2009).
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that the challenged practice denies or abridges the voting rights of
minority citizens. 242 But, the VRA does not provide the same
remedy for a section 2 violation as for a section 5 violation; 243 the
court is left to fashion its own remedy if a jurisdiction is found to
have violated section 2, which may or may not lead to the eradication
of the discriminatory voting practice.
In fact, Congress specifically included section 5 in the VRA
because it deemed prior legislation resembling section 2 to be an
insufficient method of effectively removing discriminatory voting
practices. 244 Congress recognized that the laws that preceded the
VRA and facilitated case-by-case litigation had resulted only in the
"barring of one contrivance [that] has too often caused no change in
result, only in methods." 245 Such case-by-case litigation had proved
to be a costly, time-consuming, and ineffective means of combating
widespread discriminatory voting practices because "[t]he practices
that can be used are virtually infinite," 246 and each one had to be
challenged individually. Because each voting practice had to be
addressed separately, a jurisdiction could easily replace an
invalidated discriminatory practice with another not-yet-invalidated
discriminatory practice; and unless the new practice was successfully
challenged by a prevailing plaintiff, the practice would remain in
effect. 247 Consequently, the section 5 preclearance mandate was
aimed to prevent recalcitrant jurisdictions from unilaterally switching
from one discriminatory voting practice to another. Unlike section 2,
section 5 was aimed to prevent the emergence of discriminatory
voting practices that, once enacted, could only be challenged under
section 2.248 Of course, section 5 can continue to meet this goal only
242. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 10.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
244. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 7.
245. S. REP. No. 89-162 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2543.
246. Id. at 2544-45.
247. Even if a plaintiff were to establish that a voting practice is discriminatory, it is possible
that a court would permit the practice to stand, finding that the practice was still facially valid and
only discriminatory in its application to the specific plaintiff who brought the suit.
248. Section 2 is narrower than section 5 because a cause of action under section 2 necessarily
pertains to a specific, existing practice that is being challenged. In his concurrence in Holder v.
Hall, Justice Thomas explained that section 5 is broader in its scope and reach than section 2, and
that the broad construction of section 5 should not be adopted under section 2. 512 U.S. 874,
895-96, 930 (1994).
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if it continues to impose a dynamic baseline, which is the
interpretation that has defined section 5 since its inception.
2. Section 5 Places the Burden on Covered Jurisdictions
Given its prospective nature, section 5 places the burden of
demonstrating that a proposed voting change is not discriminatory on
the jurisdiction that seeks preclearance for this change. Under
section 5, a covered jurisdiction must prove that its proposed change
lacks "the potential for discrimination. ' 249  Thus, the covered
jurisdiction bears the costs of submission to the Department of
Justice, litigation in the U.S. district court for the District of
Columbia, and any potential appeals.
Conversely, section 2 places the burden of showing that an
alleged voting practice is discriminatory on the party that is
challenging the practice. If the Department of Justice files a section
2 complaint against a jurisdiction, then it must substantiate this claim
with proof of the violation. If minority citizens allege that a given
practice has denied or abridged their right to vote, then they must
demonstrate this discrimination. In either situation, the plaintiffs
bear the burden of proving that the alleged voting practice violates
section 2. Section 2 provides minority citizens with only a cause of
action against a jurisdiction that enforces an allegedly discriminatory
voting practice. The burden of proof for this cause of action is borne
by the plaintiff. 25 To meet this burden, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the challenged practice "results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or [language]."251 The plaintiff also bears
the costs of litigating this cause of action. Although the Department
of Justice may be capable of sustaining the burden of proof and the
costs of litigation, a minority voter or a class of minority voters could
easily find both of these hurdles to be prohibitively burdensome.
Most recently, Justice Clarence Thomas emphasized in his
concurrence and dissent in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District Number One v. Holder that
249. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 181 (1985).
250. Unlike section 5, which has a non-litigation alternative in the form of a submission to the
attorney general, section 2 has no such alternative. All section 2 claims must be in the form of a
complaint and are adjudicated by the district court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
251. Id.
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Section 5 'was a response to a common practice in some
jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts
by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the
old ones had been struck down. That practice had been
possible because each new law remained in effect until the
Justice Department or private plaintiffs were able to sustain
the burden of proving that the new law, too, was
discriminatory. 252
Under section 2, the defending jurisdiction that is sued for using an
allegedly discriminatory voting practice has no affirmative burden to
demonstrate that the challenged practice does not discriminate
against minority citizens. Section 5, on the other hand, reverses
these burdens. However, if section 5 is redefined to impose a static
baseline, then a covered jurisdiction will have a much lower burden
of proof, having to show nothing more than that the proposed change
to a voting practice is the same as or no more discriminatory than the
relevant practice that was in effect on the jurisdiction's coverage
date. The untenably low threshold that results from this calculus
explains why the continued efficacy of section 5 requires the
application of a dynamic baseline.
3. Section 5 Deters Discriminatory Practices
Congress has hailed section 5 as an unparalleled deterrent to
unconstitutional barriers to voting in covered jurisdictions because its
existence prevents these jurisdictions "from even attempting to enact
discriminatory voting changes."253  The fact that section 5 is a
prospective measure and places the primary burden on the covered
jurisdiction contributes to its success.
Congress emphasized that section 5's "strength lies not only in
the number of discriminatory voting changes it has thwarted, but can
also be measured by the submissions that have been ... altered by
jurisdictions in order to comply with the VRA, or in the
discriminatory voting changes that have never materialized."254 To
252. Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2520-21
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Beer v.
United States, 425 U. S. 130, 140 (1976)) (emphasis added).
253. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 24 (2006).
254. Id. at 36. In support of this conclusion, Congress used the 2005 redistricting efforts in
Georgia as an example, noting that the state legislature adopted resolutions to comply with
section 5 before proposing any changes. Id. at 24.
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ensure their compliance with section 5, covered jurisdictions often
consult with the attorney general regarding proposed changes before
submitting a preclearance request. 255 These consultations are aimed
to ensure that their submissions do not violate section 5 and will
likely receive preclearance. 256 A request by the attorney general for
more information concerning a submission usually signals that the
change, as submitted, is not likely to be precleared. 257 Such a request
often prompts the jurisdiction that submitted the change to resubmit a
modified version of the proposed practice or withdraw its submission
altogether. 258 During its 2008 Term, the Supreme Court highlighted
this effect, noting that "the record 'demonstrat[ed] that section 5
prevents discriminatory voting changes' by 'quietly but effectively
deterring discriminatory changes."' 
29
Section 2, however, unlike section 5, does not deter a covered
jurisdiction from enacting or reenacting discriminatory voting
practices that have not yet been struck down pursuant to the VRA.
However, if section 5 would be reinterpreted to impose a static
baseline, it would no longer be able to deter covered jurisdictions
from reenacting discriminatory voting practices. This less potent
version of section 5 would necessarily entail the risk that progress in
the voting rights arena would be stalled or reversed. But, even as
recently as 2006, Congress emphasized that section 5 has not yet
outlived its usefulness. 260 Unfortunately, in the event that section 5
would no longer impose a dynamic baseline, section 2 would be
incapable of making up for the lost progress.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the area of political access and participation, the VRA has
proven to be a driving force of change. Congress has attributed
much of the progress in voting rights to the impact of section 5 and
the way in which it has been interpreted and implemented. To now
255. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J.
174, 200-01 (2007).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 200.
258. Id. at 200.
259. Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009)
(quoting Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 264
(D.D.C. 2008)).
260. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 21 (2006).
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reinterpret section 5 to impose a static instead of a dynamic baseline
for the purpose of the preclearance analysis is unwarranted and
dangerous. First and foremost, this interpretation would conflict
with the text of section 5 and other relevant provisions of the VRA.
A static baseline would also hinder the purpose of section 5 and defy
the congressional intent that underlies this provision. Moreover, a
static baseline would clash with the established application of section
5 by the Supreme Court and by the Department of Justice. But, the
greatest danger is that the use of a static baseline would render
section 5 almost impotent in its ability to prevent the reemergence of
discriminatory voting practices. Under the application of a static
baseline, covered jurisdictions could, at any given moment, reenact
the same discriminatory voting practices that they had used when
they became covered under section 5 in 1964, 1968, or 1972.
Consequently, minority citizens would have no recourse to prevent
the reemergence of such voting practices, and would have to bear the
burdens of affirmatively challenging these practices at their own
expense and with no guarantee of success. Ironically, reinterpreting
section 5 to impose a static baseline could undo much of the progress
that has already been made pursuant to the VRA. Undoubtedly, the
effect of this reinterpretation on minority voters in covered
jurisdictions could be devastating. Considering the adverse
consequences of reading section 5 to impose only a static baseline, it
is unlikely that this interpretation of the preclearance provision is
sound. Admittedly, a cursory scan for fixed dates in a dense
provision may appear to be an easier task than to constantly ascertain
the status of a fluid baseline that shifts every time progressive voting
practices are enacted. However, in light of all the circumstances, this
easier interpretation is unlikely to be the right one, and with so much
at stake, the Court cannot afford to be wrong.
